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TAXATION-FEDERAL TAX LmNs-FmsT IN TIME DETERMINES PRIOR-
ITY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL GENERAL TAX LIENs-The United States 
brought an action in a federal district court to foreclose a tax lien against a 
solvent taxpayer. Vermont held a lien against the same taxpayer for unpaid 
withholding taxes which antedated the federal lien, and was joined as a 
defendant.1 The state lien was authorized by a statute2 drawn practically 
verbatim from the federal tax lien statute.8 Thus both liens dated from a 
refusal to pay assessed taxes on demand, reached all interests in property 
of whatever nature, and were enforceable either by distraint or civil action.4 
The state claimed priority as first in time. The United States resisted this 
claim on the ground that the state lien did not bind specifically identifiable 
assets, but only the taxpayer's property in general. On cross-motions for 
judgment on the pleadings the court ordered Vermont's lien satisfied first.5 
On appeal, held, affirmed. Specificity of a state tax lien is not essential when 
competing with a federal tax lien springing from identical statutory 
language, and therefore priority is governed by the principle that first in 
time is first in right. United States v. Vermont, 317 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.), cert. 
granted, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3209 (Dec. 9, 1963). 
The Supreme Court has announced that the priority of a federal tax 
lien as against other liens is controlled by the principle that first in time is 
first in right.6 However, for nonfederal liens, time is not simply a chrono-
logical event. Rather, it is that moment when the lien conforms to a federally 
defined7 standard euphemistically known as "choateness."8 To meet the 
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7403(b). Vermont had moved to judgment and attached 
taxpayer's bank account. Since the federal lien had been filed prior to entry of the 
judgment the state could not claim seniority as a judgment creditor. INT. REv. CODE 
OF 1954, § 6323(a). 
2 "If any employer required to • • • withhold a tax • • • neglects or refuses to pay 
the same after demand, the amount ••. shall be a lien in favor of the state of Vermont 
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such 
employer. Such lien shall arise at the time assessment and demand is made • • • and 
shall continue until the liability for such sum •.• is satisfied or becomes unenforceable. 
Such lien shall be valid as against any subsequent mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or 
judgment creditor when notice .•• has been field .••. " VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5765 
(1959). 
s "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after 
demand, the amount • . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321. 
"[T]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made 
and shall continue until the liability for the amount • • . is satisfied or becomes un• 
enforceable ...• " INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322. 
"[T]he, lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, 
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed . " 
!NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a). 
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6331, 7403. State enforcement procedures are found 
in VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5767 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1791-97 (1958). 
5 United States v. Cutting & Trimming, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 951 (D. Vt. 1962). 
6 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954); accord, Rankin v. Scott, 
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827). , 
7 Priority of the federal tax lien is a federal question. E.g., United States v. Brosnan, 
363 U.S. 237 (1960); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 2ll, 213 (1955). However, determina-
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standard, the identity of the lienor must be established, the amount of the 
lien fixed beyond controversy, and the property subject thereto specifically 
ascertained.II If personal property is involved, it is probable that the non-
federal lienor will be required to have divested the taxpayer of both title 
and possession.10 The standard has been so stringently applied that the 
stated priority principle has been rendered essentially nugatory, for the 
Supreme Court has only twice11 found a sufficiently specific and perfected 
lien that could maintain its seniority. On the other hand, the standard is 
not reciprocal, for the general federal lien arises automatically once unpaid 
taxes are assessed,12 and for priority purposes is deemed "choate" at that 
time.18 
Thus, the federal tax lien statute, which does not in terms confer pri-
ority on the United States, is applied by the Supreme Court as if a provision 
conferring priority did in fact exist. This result transpired when the 
"choateness" doctrine, originated judicially to superintend the statutory 
priority of debts due the United States from insolvents,14 was carried over 
to the federal tax lien cases.15 The propriety of this parallel treatment is 
extremely dubious in the absence of congressional approval, particularly 
when it has the effect of vitiating the security a creditor may have acquired 
months or even years before the federal tax lien arose.16 Furthermore, the 
tion of property interests subject to the federal lien is a state question. E.g., Aquilino 
v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). But cf. United 
States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), reversing 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956). 
8 The term has no precise counterpart but may be equated with specificity and 
perfection . .A!s employed by the Supreme Court there is little resemblance to conventional 
definitions of these terms. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303. See generally Comment, 
54 MICH. L. REv. 829 (1956). 
9 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); accord, Illinois v. Campbell, 
329 U.S. 362 (1946). See generally PLUMB 8c WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (1961); Plumb, 
Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems (pts. 1-2), 13 TAX L. REv. 247, 459 (1958); 
Samer, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal Taxes, 95 
U. PA. L. REv. 739 (1947). 
10 Compare United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953), with United 
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). 
11 United States v. City of New Britain, supra note 10 (real property); Crest Fin. Co. 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1961) (assigned accounts receivable). The former case gave 
rise to the hope that less rigid tests would be applied in federal tax lien cases. See 
United States v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 94 (M.D.N.C. 1956); Plumb, supra note 9, at 469. 
The more recent decisions cast doubt on this. See, e.g., United States v. White Bear 
Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955). 
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322. 
13 See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954); Beeghly v. Wilson, 
152 F. Supp. 726, 734 (N.D. Iowa 1957) (declaring that the "choateness" tests apply only to 
non-federal liens). 
H REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958). For an excellent discussion of this 
development, see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The 
Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954). 
111 United States v. Security Trust 8c Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). Previously, lower 
courts had ignored "choateness" in resolving priorities with the federal tax lien. Many 
such cases are collected by Kennedy, supra note 14, at 924 n.115. 
16 In United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), the security had been 
contracted for two years before the federal tax lien arose. · 
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administrative act of assessment is not open to public scrutiny, so that 
property apparently unencumbered may actually be burdened by a secret 
federal tax lien. Although the Government's lien is not effective against sub-
sequent mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or judgment creditors until re-
corded, many entirely legitimate secured interests cannot be brought within 
these classifications.17 
With disarming simplicity, the principal case exposes the incongruities 
of the "choateness" doctrine as a device for resolving tax lien priorities, for 
liens created by exactly similar language must themselves be identical. 
Since the federal lien is deemed "choate" at its inception, must not the same 
be true of the state lien? If priorities of "choate" liens are determined on a 
first in time basis,18 Vermont's claim must then be entitled to satisfaction 
ahead of the federal government's. But as the United States pointed out, 
to be "choate" the nonfederal lien must bind specific property.19 As the 
court could not escape the congeniality of the syllogism, it therefore held 
that the requirement of specificity must not be essential. But the weight, 
if not the mandate, of precedent does not permit this conclusion. In United 
States v. Texas20 a state tax lien binding all the real and personal property 
used in the taxpayer's business was held inchoate, as the property was 
"neither specific nor constant."21 In Illinois v. Campbell22 the state had 
recorded a tax lien which bound all personal property used in the taxpayer's 
business. The Court found the lien to be inchoate, as the taxpayer had not 
filed with the state a required inventory itemizing the property. Although 
these decisions were explained in the principal case as applying only to 
priority under the insolvency statute, the Supreme Court made it clear in 
United States v. Scovil28 that it draws no such distinction. In that case the 
the federal tax lien preceded a landlord's lien and the taxpayer thereafter 
became insolvent. Although the United States was entitled to priority under 
any view, the Court made a point of saying that the landlord's lien was not 
specific because it could be released by substituting other security, namely, 
a bond. 
The court in the principal case focused on the homogeneity of the state 
and federal liens, thereby emphasizing the disparate treatment that non-
federal liens have received where the "choateness" concept was been utilized 
to resolve priorities. Further evidence of this lies in the fact that federal tax 
liens retain their "choateness" although subject to the very same defects 
that render competing liens inchoate. Thus, although demand on the tax-
payer is a condition precedent to the formation of the federal lien, once 
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a). Thus, mecbanic-lienors, landlords, attaching 
creditors, sureties, vendors, factors, and state and local taxing units are not protected. 
18 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954). 
19 Principal case at 450. 
20 314 U.S. 480 (1941). 
21 Id. at 487. 
22 329 U.S. 362 (1946). 
28 348 U.S. 218 (1955). 
1964] RECENT DECISIONS 541 
the demand is made the lien relates back to the date of assessment as far as 
its priority is concerned;24 the federal lien can be released by furnishing a 
bond conditioned on payment of the amount assessed;25 and finally, the 
federal lien embraces property acquired by the taxpayer after the lien has 
arisen.26 Alternatively, the court could have argued that the state lien was 
specific because, covering all of the taxpayer's property, no selection or 
identification was necessary.27 By not doing so the court was able to focus 
attention more distinctly on the specious and unwarranted process by which 
nonfederal liens are subordinated to the federal tax lien when Congress has 
exhibited no such intention.28 
In an era of multibillion dollar budgets, collection of the federal revenue 
is a vital and enormous task.29 Be that as it may, state and local governments 
are equally dependent on tax receipts to meet their expanding obligations. 
Furthermore, there is scant justice in taking from business creditors the 
assurance of security which the law otherwise provides. The "choateness" 
doctrine has enabled the federal tax lien to gain ascendancy over equally 
legitimate claims without an intimation by Congress that the national 
interest requires such a result. The course of decision has run too far and 
too long for the Court now to re-examine the premises of the doctrine. The 
uneasy foundation on which the decision in the principal case rests is 
additional evidence of the need for congressional revision of the tax lien 
statutes. Unless and until Congress acts to alleviate the imbalance,110 state 
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321-22. Competing liens were denied the privilege in 
United States v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942); Streeter Bros. v. Overfelt, 202 F. 
Supp. 143 (D. Mont. 1962); Brown v. General Laundry Serv., ms A.2d 601 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1!155), on remand of United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1!154); cf. 
United States v. Security Trust &: Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). 
215 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6325(a)(2). In United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955), 
property subject to a landlord's lien lacked specificity where it could be released by sub• 
stituting a bond. 
28 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1!145); Treas. Reg. § l!0I.6321-1 
(1954). But a mortgagee, protected by § 6323(a), who, pursuant to a mortgage covenant, 
has satisfied a lien for local property taxes accruing after the federal lien has arisen, is 
denied priority for that amount. United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960); United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1959); cf. 
United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963). But see Chicago Fed. Sav. &: 
Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 III. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670 (1962); Fischer v. Hoyer, 121 
N.W.2d 788 (N.D. 1963). 
27 State v. Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 46 So. 2d 553 (1950). Compare Gower v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 207 Ore. 288, 295 P.2d 162 (1956); United States v. South Carolina, 227 S.C. 187, 
87 S.E.2d 577 (1!155). But see GLENN, LIQUIDATION 734 (1!135). 
28 Congress has specified priorities in other areas: INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 5004 
(distilled spirits); REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958) (insolvent debtors); 
BANKRUPTCY ACT § 64, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 u.s.c. § 104(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
29 At the end of fiscal 1962 there were 1.056 million delinquent tax accounts totalling 
$1.036 billion. During the year $1.152 billion were collected by direct enforcement. 1962 
COMM'R OF INT. REY. ANN. REP. 46-48. 
so Various remedial proposals have been made: AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, FINAL REPORT 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LIENS (1959); Kennedy, supra note 14, at 932; see, e.g., 
S. 1347, H.R. 4952, 4953, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See generally Plumb, What Evet 
Happened to the A.B.A. Federal Tax Lien Legislation?, 18 Bus. LAw 1103 (1963). 
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legislatures can well consider reformulating their tax enforcement statutes 
to take advantage of the equality accorded the Vermont tax lien in this 
case. 
James B. Goodbody 
1 It is not clear whether the beneficiary was to receive only the trust income or a 
fixed annuity payable out of income and principal. Other cases involving annuities have 
not distinguished them from a right to receive income. See, e.g., Fortner v. Phillips, 
124 Ark. !195, 187 S.W. !118 (1916); Sherman v. Havens, 94 Kan. 654, 146 Pac. 1080 (1915). 
2 For discussion of a creditor's right to attach a beneficiary's future interest in the 
corpus of a trust, see 6 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PlloPER.TY §§ 26.96 to .100 (Casner ed. 1952). 
a Although most spendthrift trusts have involved restraints upon an equitable life 
interest, the same considerations have been held to apply to the right of a beneficiary to 
receive income until another person shall have attained a certain age. Beemer v. Challas, 
224 Iowa 411, 276 N.W. 60 (19!17); Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, '17 N.W. 1075 
(1899). See generally 6 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PlloPER.TY § 26.94 (Casner ed. 1952). 
4 The court in the principal case expressly withheld opinion on the validity of the 
restraint against voluntary alienation of the beneficiary's right to receive income. While 
the courts have generally upheld both types of restrictions, the reasoning which has 
been found to invalidate restraints upon involuntary alienation is inapplicable to 
restrictions upon voluntary alienation. Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 Atl. 186, 
19Hl2 (1935) (dictum). However, where creditors may reach a cestui's interest, a valid 
restraint upon voluntary alienation will be largely ineffectual, since the cestui may incur 
debts capable of being satisfied by execution. Cf. IA BOGERT, TRUSIS AND TRUSTEES § 222, 
at 470 (2d ed. 1951). 
Ii See GIUSWoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSIS §§ 2-9 (2d ed. 1947). 
6 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429 (Ch. 1811). For a discussion of the current 
English practice, see GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 429. 
